Evanston, Illinois. 1965. 180 p. (Ph.D. Dissertation in History)
Two factors were primarily responsible for the determined efforts of the French to establish colonial control over Fouta-Diallon in the 1880's: first, the recognition of the economic and strategic significance of Fouta as revealed by the travels and reports of Mollien, Caillé, Dagorne, Lambert, Hecquard, and Sanderval; second, the intensified European scramble for African territories following the Berlin Conference of 1884.
Having already secured control over the Nunez region in 1884, the French dispatched a mission to Timbo, in 1887. The result was that Almamy Bokar Biro committed Fouta-Diallon to a treaty of protection which guaranteed security for French citizens and trade. In exchange the French paid a subsidy and promised friendship and a guaranteed market for Foula goods. But like his predecessors, Bokar Biro continued to permit the blocking of trade routes and the pillaging of European commercial caravans. The fact was that the almamy did not receive the adherence of the provincial chiefs to the treaty. The Labé chief in particular found it profitable to raid European plantations and businesses and to force the payment of tribute in money and produce other chiefs engaged in the same kind of activity. The treaty of 1887, therefore, did not in fact subject Fouta-Diallon to French control 1.
Since treaty Agreements failed to provide prosperity and continued security for French traders and planters, France decided to apply firm control over the southern coast, and then to enforce the treaty of protection over Fouta. Thus, in 1891 French troops were dispatched from Senegal to Guinea. After having solidified their control over the coast in that year, the French proceeded to connect the Foula region and the coast by a railroad [project] in order to secure their trade and to extend effective rule over the whole of the Guinea territory. Noel-Eugene Ballay, a doctor-explorer and representative to the Berlin Conference of 1884, was assigned the task of accomplishing the mission 2.
When diplomatic negotiations failed to bring Fouta's submission, Ballay launched a military attack against the kingdom in 1896. For a while the two Foula dynastic houses cooperated in deceiving the French in peace and uniting their forces against them in war. This cooperation, however, was not long lived. Personal rivalry between the almamy and some of his provincial chiefs resulted in some of Fouta-Diallon's best troops defecting to the French side.
It was the lot of Omarou Bademba, the last of the Alfa almamys, to preside over the submission of the Kingdom of Fouta-Diallon and the establishment of the French protectorate 3. His army divided and defeated, Omarou on February 6, 1897, agreed to a treaty placing his kingdom under French protection and obliging France to respect both the Foula constitution and the almamys, who continued to rule in alternate succession. Ultimate authority, however, rested in Conakry with the French governors. Both the Alfaya and Soriya houses signed the treaty and thereby acknowledged the terms imposed by the French 4.
After conquest, French colonial policy in Fouta-Diallon focused on two primary objectives. The first was to integrate the whole of Guinea into a West African union. The motivating factor behind this objective was the realization that a coordination of administrative and economic programs of all French West African territories would be more efficient and economical. Moreover, the military operations against Ahmadou in the Sudan, Samory in Upper Guinea and Sudan, and the protracted negotiations with the Foula almamys were lengthy and expensive; they also strained the civil and military administration of the French West African colonies. In 1904, therefore, a federation was finally achieved with a governor-general, five lieutenant governors, and a federal budget. The governor-general and one lieutenant governor were assigned with a staff to the federation's headquarters in Dakar, Senegal. The remaining four lieutenant-governors with advisory staffs were assigned to Guinea, Sudan, Senegal, and Ivory Coast. The headquarters decided the general economic development of the colonies; otherwise, the individual territories remained largely autonomous 5.
The second objective of French colonial policy in Fouta-Diallon was to initiate direct political and economic administration. This policy aimed at gradually subordinating Foula chiefs and political leaders to French administrators. This was accomplished in several ways. First, Fouta was divided into smaller units—cercle, canton, and village. The cercle and canton were assigned a French resident administrator, and all three units were placed under the nominal authority of a French-supported chief. The cercle councils submitted the names of candidates for chief to the governor of the colony for ratification; canton and village chiefs required only the approval of the resident administrator. Other responsibilities of the administrator, who had a couple of French assistants and a small guard, included the maintenance of law and order, the mediation of disputes between chiefs, the supervision of tax collection, and the implementation of all laws and regulations of the colonial government in Conakry 6.
In 1906 the French partitioned Fouta-Diallon between the two dynastic houses in order to minimize conflict and rivalry for the position of almamy. As a result of this change, the Alphaya and Soriya families ruled simultaneously instead of alternately, and the almamys in power governed without any effectively organized Foula checks or opposition. Ultimate political authority, of course, remained with the French, and all chiefs "not conforming strictly to the instructions of the administrator will be deposed and replaced immediately" 7. French political policy in Fouta was thus designed for the division of the region and the progressive suppression of traditional authority.
Direct administration over the judiciary began with the organization of tribunals to judge all cases involving indigenous persons. The heads of these tribunals were karamokos chosen by the French. In cases involving an African and a European, the French administrator was authorized to conciliate, and a review of the decision could be made by the appellate (French) court in Conakry 8. This act further neutralized the power of the almamy who traditionally had been the court of final appeal.
In the economic sphere, the French sought to apply direct administration through the policy of budgetary autonomy which envisaged the day when French African colonies would become economically self-sufficient. This policy was inaugurated in Guinea in 1897 with a head tax of two francs for each African over eight years old. Those who were unable to pay in francs could pay in produce—cows, sheep, rubber, etc.—which the administrator could sell, and from which he could deduct the tax assessment 9.
In addition to the head tax, there was also a hut tax of five francs. Local chiefs were appointed to take a census and to collect both of these taxes. Periodically, the administrator checked the areas of his jurisdiction to assure that all persons
and huts were assessed and revenue properly reported. Any shortage of revenue was deducted from the local chief's commission. Taxes were distributed as follows 10:
The head and hut taxes helped stimulate the development of cash cropping, another objective of the colonial administration. This was accomplished largely by the resident administrator who discussed the importance of a particular cash crop with groups of chiefs. Each village chief was then given seeds and instruction on cultivating the crop. The preferred crop in Fouta-Diallon during the first decade of the twentieth century was rubber, the production of which in Guinea increased from 1500 tons in 1904 to 2000 tons, in 1914 and helped make the colony one of the strongest economic links in French West Africa. Personal accounts maintain that chiefs cooperated with this policy because they received payments and special favors (road building, agricultural equipment, household utensils, etc.) from the administrators. However, individual Africans who refused to participate in the program and who were not otherwise gainfully employed were subject to imprisonment or fines. Imprisonment made an African available to perform public or plantation work—a form of forced labor. Forced labor also resulted from taxation. Africans, in order to earn francs to pay taxes, were forced to seek jobs in the colonial administration, business establishments, or on plantations. The success of the French economic policy in Fouta-Diallon depended to a large extent on free African labor. Moreover, France was a signatory to the Berlin Conference treaty obliging the European powers to eliminate the slave trade in Africa. But this was a difficult task in Fouta-Diallon, as in other African areas. The concept of slavery and the use of domestic slaves were deeply entrenched in the traditional culture. Slaves were widely used in Fouta as domestics, concubines, gifts, payment for debts, and as field hands. There is at least one account of European traders paying debts with slaves in Fouta-Diallon. Indeed, the domestic slave trade was rather widespread in Fouta when the French created the colony 12.
One must be more cautious, however, in generalizing about the extent and effect of foreign slave trading in Fouta because of the limited amount of documentation. However, one account reports that Abdoul Rahman (Abdoul Rahaman), a Foula and former American slave, returned to Liberia and sought funds to free his children who remained slaves in the United States 13. In September, 1866, the French administrator in Boké observed that Chief Youra delivered 130 slaves to an unidentified ship, and this was several years after the European powers had abolished slavery and the slave trade. That same chief sold another forty slaves to unidentified traders, and traded several others to a store for forty bushels of rice 14.
After the establishment of the protectorate, one of the first acts passed by the colonial government in Conakry was an ordinance abolishing the local slave trade, forbidding the separation of slave families, requiring humane treatment of slaves, and providing that all slaves could purchase their freedom for a price not exceeding 150 francs each. The law also provided that slaves could not be used as payment for debt except in cases when the master could not otherwise meet his obligations. In this latter circumstance slaves could be assigned to work for the creditor for a specified time; after having worked the stipulated time, a slave would become free 15.
The ordinance further provided that anyone buying or selling slaves would be subject to punishment of five to ten years of public work, and the slaves would be liberated. A person convicted of stealing a slave would receive twenty years of public work 16.
In October 1902, the Boké administrator convened a meeting of several chiefs and called on them to end the slave trade. On November 29, 1902, a similar meeting was held in Labe where eighty-nine chiefs agreed to suppress the local trade. There were many violators, however, and the enforcement of the ordinance depended on the administrator and the violator. For example, many complaints were lodged against Labé Chief Alfa Yaya III for engaging in slave commerce, but he escaped punishment while several cases of lesser chiefs resulted in punishment 17.
Suppression of the slave trade and increasing restrictions on the institution of slavery constituted threats to the status of the Foula nobility who were gradually forced to resort to the more menial tasks formerly reserved for slaves. The Foula nobility, therefore, sought an agreement with the French which would have allowed a transitional period in which the slave would work a few days a week on the master's plantation while otherwise he would be free. The master would have provided the necessary supplies and equipment and would have paid the head tax 18.
Although the French refused to concede the Foula request, there were instances in which contracts were drawn up between the master and the servant allowing the latter to become free but requiring him to work for the former slaveholder for a specified number of days each week. This plan differed from the Foula proposal in that it was voluntary, and each party furnished his own supplies and paid his own taxes. While this settled some problems, its applicability varied from region to region and from plantation to plantation 19. Some of the freedmen allegedly complained about their inability to secure jobs, and the Foula nobility protested the idea of resorting to manual labor. But the Guinean archives of the period do not reveal any complaints on the part of the French administrators or businessmen. This latter point is significant because the period was one when budgetary autonomy was French policy and Guinea early became one of the most self-sufficient of the French territories in Africa. Any important economic disruption would very likely have appeared in the reports of administrators.
One reason possibly accounting for the absence of any serious economic dislocation is that the Foula economy was essentially subsistence agriculture, and the extended family could absorb many of the freedmen. A related factor is that some of the freedmen had learned skills and were able to enter trades as blacksmiths, goldsmiths, carpenters, etc., which were in demand by Europeans.
Colonial influence was also felt in another economic sphere. Before the introduction of colonial rule in Fouta-Diallon, goods normally were exchanged for products estimated at the same general value. Salt, tobacco, slaves, and cattle were used from time to time as money. Cowrie shells do not seem to have been much used. Measurements were determined by elbow lengths, pockets full, sacks, and by pacing off distances 20.
From the latter part of the nineteenth century onward, European influence became more decisive. With the increased number of trading posts on the coasts and the subsequent appearance of commercial representatives seeking trade agreements in the interior, European cloth, tools, utensils, and ornaments began replacing much of the homespun materials and the utensils and ornaments made by the local smiths. European coins and measurements increasingly superseded the more primitive indigenous systems. By the end of the century Fouta-Diallon was thus passing into a western oriented money economy. This transition was accelerated by the treaty of protection of 1897 which freed French traders from all tribal restrictions by providing that French and indigenous commerce would be on an equal footing and that French trade was exempt from all tribal taxation and royalties 21.
With the organization of the protectorate, French administrators began in 1904 developing village markets in central locations, and pressuring local chiefs to support them. Although the chiefs generally agreed, not all the Foula supported these markets which to them represented an economic threat. The traditional Foula's wealth rested on cattle and land; the new order rested on money and trade.
There were frequent charges by the Foula that their herds were raided by the traders who accused the Foula of raiding the markets. These charges and counter-charges and the general failure of the markets led the French to appoint market chiefs to report to the administrator on all aspects of market activities. By 1906 when French attempts to apply direct political administration had largely succeeded, security was established in the markets and French goods circulated more freely in the interior 22.
Colonial rule also affected traditional practices of land ownership. Under the French, all unoccupied lands (mostly almamy lands) were brought under the supervision of regional administrators, and the governor assumed the authority to approve land concessions. Thus many grants of land were made for the construction of public buildings, roads, bridges, and commercial houses 23.
The introduction of taxation and cash cropping by the French affected significantly the Foula system of land ownership. The need for money and the demand for labor in the towns greatly stimulated migrations to the urban areas. As towns became more densely populated, land became scarcer and more valuable. Land sales increased and individual ownership became more common. This was especially true in Boké, Kindia, Labé, and Mamou where the local inhabitants not only built individual homes, but they also constructed small shops. In most cases, however, the early shops were owned either by French or Lebanese merchants who occasionally rented to Africans. Thus, small village-towns emerged in various parts of Fouta-Diallon.
The impact of this urban growth, however, was not substantial until after the outbreak of World War I, by which time the Kingdom of Fouta-Diallon had largely disintegrated. Thus, traditional Foula political, economic, and social influences remained strong for many years after the French efforts at dissolution began in 1906.
Nonetheless, French policy and influence were destroying Foula political authority and undermining the Foula economic system. By the eve of World War I, the French had “pacified” Fouta-Diallon and had established the system of direct political and economic administration. This had been accomplished with much less resistance than the British and French encountered in other parts of Africa. There were at least three reasons for this. First, Fouta-Diallon was a confederation of states or provinces and was weakened by the fact that no central army remained under the direct control of the almamy. While this proved to be economical and meant that troops were spread throughout the kingdom and at any time could be ordered into action on different fronts in a minimum amount of time, the lack of centralized coordination and organization and the inability to place strong units where needed at the strategic time were serious disadvantages. This was especially critical in view of the superiority of French arms and organization, a second reason for the early pacification of Fouta.
The third reason was political. The traditional practice of dynastic competition for political power and the system of alternate succession encouraged a disunion which retarded the development of an enduring allegiance to the kingdom. These factors had long been sources of conflict that frequently resulted in civil wars. The French were thus able to play off one family or leader against another by offering bribes and promises of political power within the colonial structure.
While there was only one large, organized, enduring resistance movement to French colonial rule in Fouta-Diallon, there were several peaceful efforts by individuals and small groups to thwart the control of the French. This Foula resistance may be generally considered under two headings, Islamic and political.
Foula religious leaders regarded French social, economic, political and military encroachments as-basic threats to Islamic culture, and marabout sermons denounced French policy and action. But these sharp verbal attacks seldom were transformed into physical opposition. Most frequently, the Muslim Foula resigned himself to what he regarded as the "will of Allah." This view receives clear confirmation from the following excerpts of a Foula poem:
I thank you, my master, who let me live in this time today....
Clerics of Fouta, listen,...
God is putting us to the test.
That is why He has put us in the world at this time of the tax collectors, of those who are denied happiness in the other world.
It is the French that He [Allah] has permitted today to collect taxes, they are deprived of their full need, of honor, in the other world.
Let us therefore pay the tax, that they may eat! And the rest of us, let us observe our religion;
God will recompense us with food in the other world!
But those who will eat the tax [produce] with them,
let them know that they will go with them in the fire of Hell, in the other world.
All that they [French] demand of you,
accept freely and give everything;
He [Allah] will pay it for you,
never deceive the French.
Because they know that they are not going to the other world with things of others,
they will pay all, the French;
Oh God, protect the sons of the Faithful,
those who have accepted as their destiny to assist the French!
Not all Foula poems were so passive, as excerpts from the following reveal:
Take us back to the road of your prophets, my Lord, master of perfection.
Make us like the Angels, applied to the religion, Almighty One.
Make us follow the religion of Mohammed, turn us from all heresy, all Powerful One!
Return Timbo, to its obligation, Timbo, and its provinces, all Powerful One!
Destroy the arrogance of the rebels, the French and their Negro slaves, Almighty!...
Return vigor to religion in Fouta-Diallon,...
Destroy the Europeans in all Fouta,...
Permit us to recover our slaves, our troops, and our women, all Powerful One!
Return abundance to Fouta-Diallon,
Permit us to dominate Fouta-Diallon, replace us in possession of Fouta, in justice!
There was no lack of opposition to French rule in Fouta-Diallon; neither was there restraint in expressing that opposition among the Foula. But only once did Islam provide the motivation and ideology for a significant resistance movement against the colonial administration.
In 1907 Tierno Sekkan Aliou, widely known in Fouta-Diallon as the Ouali (saint) of the Goumbadistrict, and two other karamokos, Sankoun Diaby and Ba Gassama, began preaching against colonial injustices and organized some of the Foula of Goumba. Tierno predicted that a Madhi soon would appear to end French suppression and exploitation. In that same year a small band of Foula allegedly loyal to Tierno attacked and injured 27 a colonial official, symbol of the resented colonial administration. After this event it was widely rumored in Fouta-Diallon that the Ouali had large, quantities of arms and ammunition, an organized guard of between 600 and 700 men, and that his influence was spreading rapidly into areas bordering the Goumba district 28.
By 1911 the French had become especially apprehensive about Tierno Aliou's activities because of the imminent release of Alfa Yaya 29, the popular Labé chief who was exiled in 1905.
Colonial officials feared that the return of Alfa Yaya while the Ouali was inciting the Foula might lead to insurrection. As a preventive measure the governor of Guinea sent a military unit to arrest Tierno Aliou. In the ensuing skirmish the religious leader's troops killed the French officer and fourteen of his riflemen. With the help of reinforcements from Conakry, however, the French troops not only captured the Ouali, but they also freed about 1500 slaves, seized flocks of cattle, and burned several huts 30.
On September 23, 1911, the Court of Assises in Conakry condemned Tierno Aliou to death, but he died in prison before the execution took place. His nephew, Alimou, escaped to Sierra Leone but was later extradicted to Conakry where he was pronounced guilty as an accomplice and executed. Tierno Atigou, secretary of the indigenous tribunal of Kindia and an administrative translator for the French, received a ten-year sentence in prison for using his position to assist the movement 31.
This seems to be the only instance in which Islam was used as a means of unifying the Foula of particular districts against the French. It failed primarily because of poor organization and communication among the Foula, and the inadequacy of arms. Support for the movement extended into neighboring districts but the leaders were unsuccessful in organizing a general movement embracing the entire kingdom. Thus, although the rebel leaders received harsh punishment, the threat to the colonial administration in general was local and minimal.
The greatest resistance to the French administration in Fouta-Diallon came from Alfa Yaya, whose rise to the chieftaincy in Labé coincided with the determined penetration of the French into Fouta. Though the exact role the Labe chief played when the French first set up their headquarters in Guinea in 1891 is not clear, by 1896 his position was pro-French. In the latter year he wrote a letter to Governor Ballay promising his support as a friend of the French. He recognized his dependence on the governor and promised to conform to his orders. Because of his pro-French position, Yaya was challenged by his son 32, Modi Mamadou Saliou, who proclaimed himself chief of Labé and led an army to support the almamy. Alfa Yaya, in pursuit, killed his son and destroyed his army 33.
In 1897 the Labé chief launched an attack against Almamy Bokar Biro. There were two ostensible reasons for this. First, Bokar Biro had refused to cede the throne to Omarou Bademba who had been chosen by the electoral council. Second, Almamy Biro had dispatched troops against Bademba.
Although this internal political crisis alone might have influenced Alfa Yaya to send troops against the almamy, it is entirely possible that the Labé chief would have taken the action anyway because of his close relationship with the French 34.
Whatever the reasons for Yaya's actions, when the war was over the French commended him for his services and proclaimed him the Permanent Chief of Labe, Kadé, and Gabou (an extended region of Labé [in Guinea Bissau). Furthermore, although Alfa Yaya was theoretically under the almamy's jurisdiction, the French administrator granted him personal access to French headquarters in Timbo. Thus, at least up to 1897 when the treaty of protection was signed, and probably longer, the Labé chief supported the French administration 35.
As Permanent Chief of Labé Alfa Yaya asserted his power in several ways. He occasionally charged the almamy with failing to respect the constitution, neglecting the mission of spreading Islam to non-believers, and of serving his own personal interests. Without consulting the almamy, Alfa Yaya annexed the Ndama and Bodiar districts [northern areas on the Senegalese border], and the French supported him. The Labé chief thus gradually became the dominant chief in Fouta-Diallon 36.
The early years of the protectorate were a time of considerable unrest in Fouta-Diallon. The almamy was criticized by several chiefs and nobles as a tool of the French. In several provinces, there were Foula who opposed the signing of the treaty of protection by the almamy and other chiefs; other Foula saw in the French protectorate an opportunity for economic and political gain 37.
By forcing the almamy to rely on the colonial administration, the French not only greatly minimized his power, but also neutralized the traditional role of the ruling dynasties, the electoral council, and the almamy's officials. The French, therefore, presented a threat to both Islamic and customary law. In addition to this, provincial chiefs and nobles in Timbo, envied the close relationship between Alfa Yaya and the colonial administration. Consequently, the more the Labé chief asserted his power, the greater became the number of his enemies in Labé Province and Fouta-Diallon generally.
These several factors combined to arouse protests and uprisings in various parts of the kingdom. Those chiefs desirous of or in need of money and arms to maintain or strengthen their power cooperated with the French and made easier the implementation of colonial policy 38.
Although Alfa Yaya developed a close friendship with the French, he did not readily submit to their authority. Until 1904 there was little conflict between him and the administration, but after that time the resident administrator and the Labé chief began to quarrel over taxes. The administrator's responsibilities included the supervision of tax collection; the provincial chief was entrusted with the actual collection of taxes, from which he received a commission of ten per cent. On several occasions the administrator accused the Labé chief of falsely reporting his receipts, but because of his political and military power, his economic position 39 and his good relations with the governor, Alfa Yaya escaped punishment. Tax collection remained, however, a latent source of friction 40.
Another source of conflict involved the question of the administrative and political autonomy of the Labé chief.
Alfa Yaya interpreted his position as Permanent Chief to be one in which he retained complete control over the appointment and dismissal of subchiefs. On the other hand, a French regulation of December, 1898, required the approval of the administrator for all appointments made by the chiefs. The Labé chief had refused to recognize this regulation, with the result that a climax was reached in August, 1905, when he named a chief to the district of Yamberin. In naming a different chief, the administrator explained that his candidate more closely represented the wishes of the people. The Labé chief retaliated by sending emissaries to oppose the installation of the French candidate. When the French arrested Yaya's emissaries and installed their own candidate, the Labé chief became more openly anti-French 41.
The act which led directly to French action against Alfa Yaya was the agreement which the French concluded with the Portuguese on October 8, 1905. This agreement transferred the Labé districts of Dandoun and Kankelefa to the Portuguese. To understand the position of Alfa Yaya, it is important to recall that in 1897 the Labé chief received the support of the French for the annexation of Badiar and Takesh districts. Even if he did not have complete authority to dispose of territory under his jurisdiction, he expected to be consulted on such matters. Thus, when the French made the transfer of the two districts without prior consultation with Yaya, he accelerated his plans for a military campaign against the administration 42.
The Labé chief alerted his subordinates to the impending danger of a possible war with the French. He mobilized his army and dispatched emissaries throughout Fouta-Diallon to arouse anti-French sentiment. He also purchased arms and ammunition, some of which allegedly entered from the Gambia and Portuguese Guinea. These acts led to Alfa Yaya's arrest on November 23, 1905 43.
The circumstances leading up to Alfa Yaya's arrest and developments surrounding it remain confusing. According to Marty, the Labé chief marched an estimated 200 troops to Conakry and had a conference with the governor on what he considered an unnecessary interference in provincial affairs by the administrator. Following the conference, the governor announced that Yaya was relieved of his duties and sentenced to five years imprisonment in Dahomey 44.
Some oral accounts contend that a few years after the Labé chief became Permanent Chief, several nobles and subchiefs began conspiring against him. When the conflict between the administration and Yaya became open, the Foula conspirators allegedly worked with the French. The Labé chief is alleged to have escaped an ambush organized by these conspirators on November 23, 1905. If this is true, then the ambush and the governor's announcement relieving Alfa Yaya of his duties as Permanent Chief occurred on the same day.
A variation of this account is that the Labé chief was arrested in the French administrator's office where he had been invited for a conference. By pre-arrangement, his son, Modi Aguibou, and several of his friends were later apprehended and imprisoned at Fotoba in Fouta 45.
While these accounts differ on several details, the following relevant points can be made. First, both the French and the Labé chief realized that their differences would lead to a direct clash; second, Alfa Yaya made several enemies among the Foula who could have conspired against him; third, whether or not the French were involved in a conspiracy with Foula chiefs and nobles, the colonial administration did seek the support of followers of Modi Cellou, whose father, Alfa Gassimou, had been killed a few years earlier by Alfa Yaya 46. Lastly, in 1906 the colonial governor divided Labé Province and appointed the following chiefs: Modi Omarou for Kadé, Modi Cellou for Yamberin, and Modi Alimou for Labé. Whether or not this was by design, the French thus followed up the exile of Alfa Yaya with the partition of his territory and the appointment of his rivals 47. Moreover, these chiefs, unlike Yaya, served only as appointed intermediaries between the administration and the Foula inhabitants. The elimination of Alfa Yaya, therefore, assured the smoother application of direct rule in Labé Province.
While in exile, Alfa Yaya corresponded with several friends. Consequently, as the expiration date of his sentence approached, Labé prepared for a big homecoming. In November 1910, some of Yaya's friends met at Modi Seidou's Labé home to discuss how the ex-chief could recover his power. It appears that many Foula looked upon their former leader's return as an opportunity to reestablish their positions in a revived old order. Even former enemies of Yaya expressed a preference for a return to the days before direct administration was established 48.
On the eve of the former chief's release, there were large demonstrations in several areas of Fouta-Diallon, and in some bordering Portuguese districts. In Labé Province a karamoko, Tierno Aliou Boubha Ndiyan, organized a grand welcoming celebration 49.
When the Foula leader arrived in Conakry on November 30, 1910, a huge gathering received him. Admirers had come from Fouta-Diallon and from as far away as Senegal and Portuguese Guinea. For several days the ex-chief received many visitors. The French, however, were apprehensive and had alerted the police and employed spies to make sure that the demonstrations would not precipitate a movement to restore the old order 50.
In a conference on December 4, 1910, the governor informed Alfa Yaya that he could reside in Labé on the condition that he promise not to leave the country and not to participate in any political or administrative activities. All his property would be restored to him except the slaves, who had been freed. The administration promised him 25,000 francs a year for as long as he remained loyal to the French. Yaya accepted these terms by swearing on the Koran, an act for which he was reproached by his son, Aguibou, and condemned by some of his friends. They were humiliated that a great chief like Alfa Yaya would swear to terms of an agreement that effectively eliminated him from the political leadership his loyal followers hoped he would assume 51.
Duplicity, however, had long been a part of the ex-chief's career. He conferred with a marabout in Conakry and concluded that he could be absolved from the oath. Thus relieved, he began organizing an anti-French plot, the details of which remain vague. It appears that he hoped to recover his former position in Labé but realized that this would be impossible without military support in both Labé Province and Conakry. Yaya therefore dispatched emissaries into various parts of Fouta-Diallon to obtain material and spiritual support. Some villages of Dandoun and districts in Portuguese Guinea committed themselves to the former chief's support. Arms and ammunition were bought. In case the plot failed, Alfa Yaya planned to escape into Sierra Leone 52.
The close surveillance which the French maintained over the ex-chief's quarters resulted in the extinction of the plot. Hired African informants, one of whom was Fodé Touré, who allegedly performed that same role against Yaya in 1905, secured valuable information on the conspiracy. Then on February 9, 1911, Alfa Yaya was arrested a second time. In October, 1911, he was convicted and exiled to Etienne, Mauretania, and granted an annual pension of 6000 francs. His son Aguibou and an adviser, Omarou Koumba, were also arrested and exiled to Port Etienne for ten years. The great chief died in 1912, having been the victim of Foula political rivalry and the determined application of direct rule by the French 53.
Although labelled by some as a tyrant and opportunist, Alfa Yaya is revered by most Foula and Guineans as a great warrior who established law and order in Labé Province, and who, in spite of his negligible educational background, encouraged the development of Koranic schools. But most of all, the Labé chief's legacy is honored primarily as a symbol of resistance to French colonialism, his earlier cooperation with the French notwithstanding. That Alfa Yaya became widely venerated throughout Guinea is confirmed by the fact that an epic poem honoring him was composed by some griots of the Malinké ethnic group, once enslaved by the Foula. The following is that poem, which later became a chant, the tune of whicn has been adopted for the national anthem of the Republic of Guinea.
Alfa Yaya, all the chiefs are not equal.
It's the anticipated good that justifies present suffering.
It's completely over. Slavery is all over.
With its curses, its floggings, all the suffering is over.
It's completely over. Slavery is allover.
Its rice, fonio, and rubber levies are all finished.
Yes, it's the anticipated good that justifies suffering.They are not all equal.
He woke up, he got up.
The one who never flees went away [was arrested and deported].
It's the good that justifies suffering.They are not all equal.
It scattered. The flock of birds scattered.
The big forest burned, the flock of wild game scattered.
He is afraid of nothing. the one who never flees is afraid of nothing.Alfa Yaya, the one who never flees, has been afraid of nothing.
The Foula [Alfa Yaya] is gone [arrested and deported].They are not all equal.
Tears were shed.
[Alfa Yaya is] Not the petty father of a mediocre son.It's the good that justifies suffering.
Tears were shed.
It's the good [Alfa Yaya's deeds] that brought out tears.
The eyes hurt from crying [about Yaya's arrest].It's the good that makes it worth the pain.
He is not the petty father of a mediocre son.
It's the good that makes it worth the suffering.
Yes, its the anticipated good.They are not all equal.
He woke up, he got up. The one whonever flees got up.
He left [for prison]. The one who never flees went away.
Of a Foula mother, of a Foula father, the one who does not flee
— good day.The Foula [Alfa Yaya]
Hail!
They are not all equal.
The point of the poem is obvious. Alfa Yaya is revered as a symbol of anti-colonialism, a great chief without equal in Fouta-Diallon. Because he resisted colonial rule, he was arrested and subsequently deported. In reverence to his domestic rule and courageous stand against the French, the Foula wept; but, as Muslims, they looked to the future for rectification. Yaya's sacrifice, therefore, was not in vain. While there is no unanimity on when the poem was first recited . Foula concensus is that it appeared "shortly" after Yaya was arrested. Whether this was after the first or second arrest is not clear 55. In either case, the poem appeared long before the end of colonialism. How, therefore, does one explain the reference to freedom from slavery, curses, floggings, and levies of various kinds? These conditions existed long after Alfa Yaya's death. One explanation is that the section was added after independence to follow through on the theme, "It's the anticipated good that justifies present tears," and "It's the good that makes it worth the suffering." Whatever the true explanation, it seems likely that the poem was composed over several years. It has become a major symbol of nationalism in Guinea and thus reveals the prominent position the Foula occupy in Guinean history. In a discussion of the national anthem, President Sékou Touré observed that "Alfa Yaya is like the hymn [anthem] of the Republic of Guinea, he is not a person, he is everything. That is an immortal page, living, of our common history, a part of our past which is projected into our future." 56
France did not form a policy for Fouta-Diallon until the late 1880's when the efforts of British and French merchants and explorers to penetrate the interior and negotiate treaties with the almamys led to a lively international rivalry. The French eventually succeeded because of the proximity of their colonial headquarters In Senegal, and the concentration of British policy not only in Egypt and South Africa, but also in Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, and Nigeria.
After the creation of the protectorate In 1897, the French pursued the policy of direct administration which envisaged economic self sufficiency and political subordination of Fouta-Diallon. This policy required law and order, the development of adequate communication systems, and a clearly defined civil administration. Until the final exile of Alfa Yaya the French concentrated their efforts on suppressing rebellions and winning the support of chiefs who could be included in that civil administration.
After the elimination of Alfa Yaya, the major elements of Foula resistance disappeared and the Kingdom of Fouta-Diallon was effectively incorporated into the colony of Guinea, one of several politically emasculated territories of French West Africa. Fouta, itself was divided into smaller units over which traditional chiefs either were installed in redefined capacities or were replaced by pro-French appointees. By 1913 the French had firmly entrenched direct political and economic control.
Islam and its identification first with Foula culture and subsequently with traditional practices, such as marriages, names and naming ceremonies, circumcisions, funerals, superstitions, and the general social and economic structure. These became accepted as normal activities and conditions in Fouta-Diallon. The imposition of French rule, therefore, did not greatly affect traditional Foula behavior and institutions. Moreover, up to 1906 the French ruled indirectly. Thus the Muslim Foula retained political and economic dominance, his cultural influence in ceremonies and daily life persisted, and the slaves, ex-slaves, and immigrants continued to regard him as leader and master.
However, the continued acceptance of the Muslim Foula institutions and patterns of behavior in Fouta-Diallon depended largely on the extent to which alien forces were resisted. Although Foula chiefs and religious leaders attempted to prevent the increasing influence of Europeans, the attraction of material wealth and the determination of the French to impose their social, economic, and political system forced Fouta-Diallon to become accommodative. From 1906 when the French divided Fouta-Diallon between two pro-French almamys, to 1913 when direct economic and political administration became a reality, French influence slowly permeated the community through the schools, the French language and culture. The result was that the kingdom in redefined capacities or were replaced by pro-French appointees. By 1913 the French had firmly entrenched direct political and economic control.
Notes
1. Petit Historique, and personal interviews.
2. Rapport Officiel, Correspondances Diverses, 1898.
3. Within a few months the French deposed Bademba on the charge that he had been allied to [the Maninka emperor and French military enemy] Samory Touré: Niane and Suret-Canale, Histoire de l'Afrique Occidentale, p. 136, and personal interviews.
4. See the copy of the Treaty in Appendix No.1.
5. Newbury, "The Formation of the Government General," pp. 111-123, and Stephen H. Roberts, The History of French Colonial Policy, 1370-1925 (Hamden, Connecticut: 1963), p. 310.
6. Correspondances Diverses, "Administration du Fouta Djallon," 2 Decembre 1898.
7. Correspondances Diverses, Declaration of the administrator of Fouta-Diallon. 2 Décembre 1898.
8. Correspondances Diverses, Ordonnance No. 4.
9. Correspondances Diverses, Ordre No. 1.
10. Loc. cit.
11. Correspondances Diverses, Ordonnance No. 5; Suret-Canale, "Guinea Under the Colonial System," Présence, Africaine (Paris: 1959), pp. 46-48; and personal interviews.
12. Journal Politique de la Region du Labé, Juillet, Novembre 15, 1902, and Septembre 12, 1904; Demougeot, "Histoire du Nunez," pp. 274-275.
13. Samuel Wilkeson. The American Colonies in Liberia (Washington: 1839). p. 40.
14. Demougeot, "Histoire du Nunez," p. 252.
15. Correspondances Diverses, Ordonnance No. 3.
16. Loc. cit.
17. Correspondances Diverses. Journal Politique de la Région du Labé, Novembre, 1902; Journal Politique du Boké, Octobre, 1902.
18. Personal interviews.
19. Personal interviews.
20. Vieillard. Notes sur les Coutumes, pp. 111-114; Marty, L'Islam en Guinée, pp. 457-458; and personal interviews.
21. See copy of the Treaty in Appendix No. 1.
22. Journal Politique de la Région du Labé, 1904, and personal interviews.
23. Personal interviews and the Treaty of Protection.
24. Vieillard, "Poèmes Peuls du Fouta Djallon," Bulletin du Comité d'Etudes historiques et scientifiques de l'A.O.F., Tome.XX, No. 3, Juillet-Septembre (Paris: 1937), pp. 249-257.
25. Ibid., pp. 259-265.
26. Ibid., pp. 241-247.
27. The Pita administrator was not simply injured, but killed, indeed...(Tierno S. Bah)
28. Personal interviews; Marty L'Islam en Guinée, pp. 77-80; and Demougeot, Notes , p. 17.
29. Discussed under Political Resistance, the next section.
30. Marguerite Verdat, "Le Ouali de Goumba," Etudes Guinéenes (Conakry: 1949), pp. 5859, and personal interviews.
31. Marty, L'Islam en Guinée, p. 88; Verdat, "Le Ouali de Goumba," pp. 60-65; and personal interviews.
32. In reality, it was one of twelve half-brothers. (Tierno S. Bah)
33. Archives de Alfa Yaya, 1897, and 6 Avril 1898; and personal interviews.
34. Archives de Alfa Yaya, 1897; and personal interviews.
35. Archives de Alfa Yaya, 6 Fevrier 1897; and personal interviews.
36. Aperçu Général, p. 8; and Archives de Alfa Yaya, 6 Fevrier 1897 Avril, 6 1838.
37. Personal interviews.
38. Personal interviews.
39. Labé Province occupied the northwestern region of Fouta-Diallon and therefore was in a position to control the rubber caravans to the Nunez. Alfa Yaya periodically directed Foula caravans to neighboring Portuguese Guinea where prices were sometimes higher. See Archives de Alfa Yaya, 1896-1905.
40. Correspondances Diverses, Ordre No. 1, and personal interviews.
41. Archives de Alfa Yaya, 1905; Marty, L'Islam en Guinée, p. 43; and personal interviews.
42. Archives de Alfa Yaya, Octobre 1905; Marty, L'Islam en Guinée, p. 43.
43. Archives de Alfa Yaya; Marty, L'Islam en Guinée, p. 43; and personal interviews.
44. Marty, L'Islam en Guinée, p. 44, 46.
45. Aperçu Général, p. 8, and personal interviews.
46. Correspondances Diverses, "Rapport de l'Administrateur Adjoint sur l'Affaire de Modi Aguibou," Novembre, 1905.
47. In addition to Modi Cellou, Modi Alimou had declared himself for the French. Marty, L'Islam en Guinée, p. 45, and personal interviews.
48. Personal interviews.
49. Personal interviews and Demougeot, Notes, p. 5ts.
50. Archives de Alfa Yaya, 1911; Demougeot, Notes, p. 58; and personal interviews.
51. Etudes Guinéennes, 1949, pp. 76-78; Marty, L'Islam en Guinée, p. 47; and personal interviews.
52. Archives de Alfa Yaya, 1911; Marty, L'Islam en Guinée, pp. 50, 51.
53. Aperçu Général, p. 8; Archives de Alfa Yaya, 1911; Marty, L'Islam en Guinée, p. 51; and personal interviews.
54. Translated from Malinké into English by Ousmane Diop, a Foula graduate student at the University of California at Berkeley. Diop studied English under the writer in Guinea.
55. On the contrary, Mamba Sano has discussed in great details the history of the Alfa Yaya praise-song.
56. Sékou Touré,
Expérience Guinéenne et Unité Africaine (Paris: 1961),
p. 451.